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REDEFINING GLOBAL SECURITY

with a Foreword by Mikhail Gorbachev

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Laying the Foundations for Peace

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As people around the world watched in horror when the twin towers of the World Trade Center crumbled on September 11, 2001, it was the immediate human toll that was uppermost in their minds. But it soon became clear that the events of that day had a larger significance, ushering in a new era in world history. Just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, caused the United States to declare war on Japan the following day, the events of September 11th led to President George W. Bush's assertion of a war on terrorism before the day was over. And just as the postwar period came to define a historical epoch, the post-9/11 years will long be recognized as fundamentally different from the time before.¹

Yet today's global security problems differ significantly from those of the World War II era. Unlike the territorial expansionism of that time, most contemporary flashpoints involve new kinds of challenges, such as internal civil conflicts and international terrorism. These problems are rooted in societal instabilities that are paired with a complex array of

phenomena—from poverty and disease to population growth and environmental degradation to religious fundamentalism and ethnic hatred. (See Chapter 1.) Traditional military techniques are of limited use in responding to these underlying forces.²

The stance taken by the United States toward the larger world community was also markedly different in the aftermath of September 11th than it was during World War II. President Bush initially spoke of the importance of international cooperation in combating global terrorism. But his subsequent decision to invade Iraq in early 2003 without securing backing from the U.N. Security Council shattered initial hopes that the struggle against terrorism would be a uniting rather than a divisive effort. During World War II, in contrast, the United States worked with its allies before it even entered the war to begin laying the foundations for a lasting postwar peace by developing a detailed blueprint for creating the United Nations. This effort culminated in the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in June 1945, as the

war entered its final months.³

Still another way in which the current security environment differs from that after World War II is the growing influence of global civil society. Citizens' organizations have long been powerful advocates of a more peaceful world, including pushing hard for the creation of the United Nations. But recent decades have seen a pronounced surge in civil society's role, power, and global reach.⁴

Despite the many differences between 1945 and today, a central insight of that era still holds true: laying the foundations for lasting global peace will require international cooperation on a broad range of fronts—from resisting aggression to combating terrorism, mediating peace settlements, and addressing the underlying causes of conflict and instability. At the same time, the experience of recent decades has made it clear that building a secure world will require extensive interactions among a broad range of actors, including visionary and committed national and local politicians and government officials as well as engaged, globally minded citizens.

Reinventing Global Governance

The international divide over the wisdom of the Iraq war plunged the United Nations into an identity crisis. As U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it in fall 2003 when he addressed world leaders at the U.N. General Assembly: "Three years ago, when you came here for the Millennium Summit, we shared a vision, a vision of global solidarity and collective security.... Recent events have called that consensus in question.... We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945, when the United Nations was founded.... Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical

changes are needed." The crisis created by the controversy over the Iraq war thus had the silver lining of creating a moment of opportunity to lay the foundations for peace by redesigning the United Nations for the security challenges of today and tomorrow.⁵

As the world sets about this task, it is important to consider how well the original structures of 1945 have withstood the test of time. The first purpose of the United Nations, as defined by its charter, is "to maintain international peace and security." Toward that end, the U.N. charter stipulates a set of mechanisms for the Security Council that are designed to galvanize a collective response from U.N. members when confronted with a compelling threat to global peace and stability.⁶

Contrary to expectations, cross-border military incursions have been relatively rare since the United Nations was created. But there has been no shortage of civil strife, and the organization has often played an important role in helping to negotiate and then maintain the peace. The United Nations has helped to bring about over 170 peace settlements, including those that ended the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988, and brought the El Salvador civil war to a close in 1992. The 59 U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1948 have helped countries maintain ceasefires, conduct free and fair elections, and monitor troop withdrawals in countries as diverse as Cambodia, Cyprus, and East Timor.⁷

But from the very beginning the United Nations was intended to be about much more than military matters. The U.N. Charter states that one of the organization's central purposes is "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character." These provisions came about in

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part in response to a widely shared belief that the disastrous world economic conditions of the 1930s had indirectly helped precipitate World War II by creating a climate ripe for the rise of Nazism.⁸

This same conviction also underlay a major international conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 that led to the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which has since been transformed into the WTO—the World Trade Organization). Technically speaking, the World Bank and the IMF are specialized agencies of the United Nations, but from the beginning they have shown little inclination to associate themselves closely with the rest of the organization. In fact, a 1947 agreement between the World Bank and the United Nations has been described as being “as much, or more, a declaration of independence from the U.N., as an agreement to work together.” Similar problems have plagued the relationship with the WTO, with U.N. agencies such as the International Labour Organization and the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) forced to battle for the right to even observe WTO deliberations.⁹

In the half-century since the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions were created, poverty and destitution around the world have proved to be formidable foes. Nonetheless, the U.N. system has seen its share of successes on a range of social issues. In the field of global health, for instance, the World Health Organization (WHO), a U.N. specialized agency, initiated a global campaign to eradicate smallpox in 1967. At that time, the disease afflicted up to 15 million people annually, leading to some 2 million deaths. In 1980, WHO certified that the disease had been conquered globally. (See Chapter 3.) It is now nearing similar successes

with leprosy, guinea worm, polio, and Chagas disease. Eradication is unfortunately nowhere in sight for a number of other deadly diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, but WHO is working with other international institutions and partners to reduce the number of people stricken by these diseases and to expand access to treatment for those who need it.¹⁰

The United Nations has also proved adaptable in the face of new problems and challenges. Neither rapid population growth nor environmental degradation, for instance, was recognized as a significant global problem in 1945. As a result, neither of them is even mentioned in the U.N. Charter. But as the seriousness of both problems gradually became apparent, new institutions were set up to address them: the U.N. Fund for Population Activities in 1962; UNEP in 1972; and in the early 1990s the Global Environment Facility, a joint undertaking of the World Bank, the U.N. Development Programme, and UNEP that funds projects in developing countries that address global environmental threats such as climate change and the loss of biological diversity.¹¹

Similarly, the spread of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are relatively new preoccupations of the world community, and the United Nations is being called on to play a growing role in combating them. As Secretary-General Annan argued before the U.N. General Assembly within weeks of the September 11th attacks: “The legitimacy that the United Nations conveys can ensure that the greatest number of States are able and willing to take the necessary and difficult steps—diplomatic, legal, and political—that are needed to defeat terrorism.” He went on to discuss the importance of governments moving forward to adopt and ratify the 12 international conventions and protocols on international terrorism that already exist and

to implement and enforce key international treaties designed to minimize the spread of weapons of mass destruction, such as those that ban chemical and biological weapons and nuclear proliferation.¹²

Through a series of high-profile international conferences over the last few decades, the United Nations has shone the spotlight on emerging issues of global concern and helped to propel action to address them globally and nationally. The 1994 U.N. Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, for example, forged a new global consensus on the relationship between population stabilization, reproductive health care, and women's empowerment, including agreement on a series of goals on access to universal education and reproductive health services.¹³

The new understandings on the range of issues addressed by the global conferences of the 1990s ultimately found expression in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted unanimously in preliminary form at the 2000 U.N. Millennium Assembly. (See Box 9-1.) And the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, brought renewed political attention to sustainable development challenges, including the adoption or reaffirmation by governments of a broad range of targets on water, energy, health, agriculture, and biological diversity. (See Box 9-2.) The United Nations is currently finding a growing role for itself in encouraging governments to implement the policy reforms needed to achieve these goals and targets and in tracking their progress along the way.¹⁴

Despite all the achievements to date, there can be little question that bold reforms are needed to lay the foundations for peace by better equipping the United Nations for the security challenges of today and tomorrow. The need for periodic renovations to U.N. structures was in fact foreseen from the begin-

ning, with U.S. President Harry Truman noting in his speech to the 1945 San Francisco conference that "this charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved upon as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or a perfect instrument.... Changing world conditions will require readjustments." Toward this end, in September 2003 Secretary-General Annan announced the appointment of a panel of eminent world leaders charged with examining current threats and challenges to global peace and security and considering far-reaching changes to address them. The panel's report will form the basis for Annan's recommendations to the U.N. General Assembly in fall 2005.¹⁵

Despite achievements to date, bold reforms are needed to lay the foundations for peace by better equipping the United Nations for the security challenges of today and tomorrow.

One particularly high priority in preparing the United Nations for the future is to rethink the composition of the Security Council. In 1945, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom were given a special status as permanent Council members, with the right to veto resolutions. Without these provisions, it is unlikely that either the United States or the Soviet Union would have joined the new organization. But these arrangements had a price: heavy resort to the veto has at times hamstrung the effectiveness of the Security Council, particularly during the cold war, and the council's limited permanent membership is now widely viewed as anachronistic and undemocratic.¹⁶

Although proposals for altering the status quo are bound to bump up against formidable opposition, a consensus is nonetheless

BOX 9-1. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND TARGETS**Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**

By 2015, reduce by half both the proportion of people living on less than \$1 a day and the share suffering from hunger.

Achieve universal primary education

Ensure that by 2015 all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling.

Promote gender equality and empower women

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.

Reduce child mortality

By 2015, reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five.

Improve maternal health

By 2015, reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality rate.

Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases

Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other major diseases by 2015.

Ensure environmental sustainability

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. By 2015, cut in half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation. By 2020, improve significantly the lives of 100 million slum dwellers.

Develop a global partnership for development

Develop an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, nondiscriminatory, and includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction. Address the special needs of least developed countries, small island developing states, and landlocked countries. Make debt sustainable, increase youth employment, and provide access to essential drugs and new technologies.

SOURCE: See endnote 14.

building that changes are needed in order to make the Security Council more representative of today's world. In September 2004, the governments of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India issued a joint statement noting that "the Security Council must reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st Century." In addition to pushing their own cause as strong candidates for permanent membership, the four countries underscored that similar status should also be granted to an African nation.¹⁷

It is also important to bolster the United Nations' ability to address underlying threats

to international peace and security, including poverty, disease, environmental decline, and rapid population growth. The Security Council could be given a broadened mandate to address nontraditional security issues, as happened in 2000 on HIV/AIDS. Unlike other U.N. organs, the Security Council has significant enforcement capabilities at its disposal, so addressing new security threats there offers important practical as well as symbolic benefits. Other possible approaches include strengthening and streamlining current economic and social organs, such as the Economic and Social Council, or creating a new

**BOX 9-2. SELECTED TARGETS
ADOPTED AT THE WORLD
SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT**

- Halve the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015.
- Restore fisheries to their maximum sustainable yields by 2015 and prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by 2004.
- Significantly reduce the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010.
- Reverse the current trend in natural resource degradation.
- Crack down on illegal logging that contributes to deforestation.
- Ensure that by 2020, chemicals are not used and produced in ways that harm human health and the environment.
- Ensure energy access for at least 35 percent of Africans within 20 years.
- Use renewable energy to meet 10 percent of the energy needs of Latin American and Caribbean countries by 2010, reaffirming a pledge by those countries.

SOURCE: See endnote 14.

Economic Security Council or a similar high-level body that is dedicated to preventing conflict by reducing poverty and addressing other underlying causes of insecurity.¹⁸

There have also been a number of calls over the years to give environmental issues a more central home within the U.N. system. Among the ideas put forward have been proposals to create an Environmental Security Council, use the now-disbanded U.N. Trusteeship Council for this purpose, create a U.N. High Commissioner for Environment or Sustainable Development, or create a new Global Environmental Organization. The most politically salient proposal is a

variation on the last idea: led by President Jacques Chirac, the government of France is promoting the transformation of the Nairobi-based UNEP into a full-fledged U.N. specialized agency, like WHO and UNESCO. This proposal is currently being actively considered at a range of international meetings, although it remains unclear if it will garner sufficient support to be acted on in the near term.¹⁹

In addition to improving the social, economic, and environmental machinery of the United Nations, it will also be important to reform the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO, each of which has become both increasingly powerful and increasingly controversial over the years. These institutions are widely seen to disproportionately represent the interests of major industrial countries, either as a result of their formal voting procedures or through less formal but no less influential entrenched ways of doing business. Each organization has also been criticized in recent years for promoting orthodox economic globalization strategies that in some cases have harmed rather than helped poor people and the environment.²⁰

One way to address these deficiencies would be for the global economic institutions to work more closely with the United Nations. This collaboration would help ensure that the new development consensus expressed in the Millennium Development Goals and in the broad range of U.N. environmental, social, and human rights accords is more clearly reflected on the ground, including in post-conflict situations. Creating a new high-level oversight board with some measure of authority over both the United Nations and global economic institutions would be one strategy for promoting the needed collaboration.²¹

Another high priority for a peaceful and secure future is redesigning global gover-

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nance structures so that they do more to harness the energy and insights of a broad array of actors, including civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector. In part spurred by pressure from the globalization protest movement, both the United Nations and the international economic institutions have recently taken steps to make their operations more transparent to civil society. But many hurdles remain in bringing about full and meaningful public participation.²²

Shifting Government Priorities

Reshaping international institutions is only a first step. The United Nations and affiliated organizations, acting through their member governments, lay out visions, enumerate goals for the global community, and help guide implementation efforts. But national governments have the tough tasks of marshaling the domestic political will and resources needed to make that vision a reality and of ensuring that their priorities are in line with today's burgeoning new global security threats.

One of the first things governments can do is recognize how misdirected security spending is today. Nearly \$1 trillion is spent annually on the world's militaries, most of which is targeted at traditional security threats. As political leaders recognize poverty, rapidly growing populations, disease, and environmental degradation to be legitimate security issues, these concerns could assume greater importance in government budgets. At the same time, a tabulation of military programs that are outdated, ineffective, or otherwise wasteful will likely highlight rich sources of funding that could be redirected to addressing social and environmental threats. In this new framework, social and environmental programs long deemed too expensive could suddenly be viewed as affordable—in fact,

even indispensable.²³

Fortunately, the international framework to address this complex array of threats already exists—the Millennium Development Goals and the World Summit on Sustainable Development targets. At the 2000 Millennium Assembly, the members of the United Nations agreed to reduce global poverty, disease, and societal inequities significantly by 2015. The World Summit targets, adopted two years later, rounded out the picture by addressing how countries can further improve social conditions by protecting critical natural systems. These goals were primarily adopted in order to address growing global inequities in a sustainable manner. In the post-9/11 world, however, where security threats have become the dominant concern, the MDGs can equally be seen as a means to strengthen national and global security.²⁴

While the commitment on paper to achieving the MDGs is strong, progress for the most part has been excruciatingly slow. In 2004, the World Economic Forum asked some of the world's leading development experts to analyze the progress made during the first three years of working toward the Millennium Development Goals. The results were discouraging: the world had only put in a third of the effort needed to achieve these goals.²⁵

While some countries have made notable progress in reaching a number of the MDG targets (see Table 9–1), few nations are on track to achieve the majority of the goals (see Table 9–2). According to the World Bank, less than one fifth of all countries are currently on target to reduce child and maternal mortality and provide access to water and sanitation, for example, while even fewer are on course to contain HIV, malaria, and other major diseases. The World Economic Forum analysis makes it clear that the primary

Table 9-1. Progress in Increasing Access to Food and Water in Selected Countries

Country	MDG Target: Reduce Hunger by Half				MDG Target: Reduce by Half Those Lacking Access to Water			
	1990–92	1999–2001	2015 Objective	On Track?	1990	2000	2015 Objective	On Track?
	(percent of population undernourished)				(percent of population without access to improved water source)			
Bangladesh	35	32	18		6	3	3	Yes
Brazil	12	9	6	Yes	17	13	8	Yes
China	17	11	9	Yes	29	25	14	
Egypt	5	3	3	Yes	6	3	3	Yes
India	25	21	13		32	16	16	Yes
Kenya	44	37	22		55	43	27	Yes
Mexico	5	5	3		20	12	10	Yes
Peru	40	11	20	Yes	26	20	13	Yes
Thailand	28	19	14	Yes	20	16	10	Yes
Uganda	23	19	12	Yes	55	48	27	

SOURCE: See endnote 26.

reason for failure is a lack of focus on basic development priorities.²⁶

When governments do set the achievement of certain goals as a priority, however, they can rapidly register great success—success that is often multiplied because of the strong connection between different societal problems. By investing in AIDS prevention, for example, governments not only curtail the spread of the disease, they also reduce health care costs, the number of orphaned children, the loss of economic productivity, and the loss of much-needed professionals such as teachers and doctors.

Thailand saw the wisdom of preventive investments early on. In 1990, after receiving a study stating that if HIV were left unchecked it would infect 4 million Thais by 2000 and cost 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) per year, Minister to the Prime Minister's Office Mechai Viravaidya recognized that AIDS was not just a health issue but "a major threat to national security." After encouragement from Mechai, as he is known throughout the country, Prime Min-

ister Anand Panyarachun personally led an AIDS prevention campaign. With this level of commitment, all government ministries were empowered to tackle AIDS. Funding skyrocketed from \$684,000 in 1988 to \$82 million in 1997, and Thailand was able to reduce new infections from a high of 143,000 in 1991 to 19,000 in 2003.²⁷

Other countries have come up with creative ways to tackle many goals simultaneously. In Mexico, for instance, almost 20 million people in 1995 could not afford to eat enough to meet their minimum daily nutritional needs, 10 million lacked basic health care, and at least 1.5 million children were not in school. The government created a "conditional cash transfer" welfare program that provided payments based on a family's commitment to specific health and education requirements. Recipients had to show that their children were enrolled in school, that mothers received monthly nutrition and hygiene lessons, and that families got routine health checkups. The results were striking. Illness fell 25 percent among infants

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Table 9–2. Regional Progress in Achieving Selected Millennium Development Goals

Region	Poverty	Hunger	Primary Education	Child Mortality	Access to Water	Access to Sanitation
Arab States	achieved	reversal	on track	lagging	n. a.	n. a.
Central/Eastern Europe and CIS	reversal	n. a.	achieved	lagging	achieved	n. a.
East Asia/Pacific	achieved	on track	achieved	lagging	lagging	lagging
Latin America/Caribbean	lagging	on track	achieved	on track	on track	lagging
South Asia	on track	lagging	lagging	lagging	on track	lagging
Sub-Saharan Africa	reversal	reversal	lagging	lagging	lagging	reversal
WORLD	on track	lagging	lagging	lagging	on track	lagging

SOURCE: See endnote 26.

and 20 percent among children under five. Children's height and weight increased significantly, while rates of anemia fell 19 percent. School enrollment rates also increased since families felt less financial pressure to have their children go to work. By 2004, the program was providing benefits to more than 25 million people, at a cost of just 0.3 percent of Mexico's GDP.²⁸

Although national governments are the natural leaders in pursuing the MDGs, a great deal can be done at the regional and local level as well when policymakers are determined to address societal problems. One of the most famous examples is the state of Kerala in India. Compared with the whole country, Kerala's development statistics are impressive: infant mortality is one quarter the national rate, immunization rates are almost double, and the fertility rate is two thirds that of India's. (In fact, at 1.96 births per woman, Kerala has a lower fertility rate than

the United States does.) In conjunction with strong civic engagement, a large measure of Kerala's success derives from dedication by government officials that made the broad provision of health care, education, and other basic services a priority.²⁹

The city of Porto Alegre in Brazil has also made huge gains in improving health and social conditions. In just a decade the percentage of the population with access to water and sanitation jumped from 75 to 98 percent and the number of schools quadrupled. This happened mainly because the municipal government gave local people the power to set government funding priorities. People decided to devote resources to ensuring their basic needs were met, which meant increasing the health and education budget from 13 percent in 1985 to almost 40 percent in 1996.³⁰

Yet even as governments work to reach basic development goals, they will need to

pursue them in an ecologically sustainable manner to avoid making short-term gains at the expense of long-term well-being and security. One example of how not to develop is provided by the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia. In 1960, government planners started an aggressive economic development program to transform an arid region into the cotton belt of the Soviet Union. For a time, they succeeded: irrigated land grew to 7 million hectares (twice the irrigated area of California), farmers consistently exceeded production quotas, and the area became a leading supplier of cotton and produce for the Soviet Union. But water was drained too rapidly from the rivers that fed the Aral Sea, and the rivers started to run dry.³¹

Today, the Aral Sea is less than half the area it once was, with less than a fifth as much volume. The fishery that originally supplied 45,000 tons of marketable fish a year is dead. And salt from the dried seabed, carried throughout the region on the wind, now contaminates the area and poisons remaining agricultural lands. Worse, without the sea to regulate the climate, the growing season has shortened and rainfall has shrunk, straining agriculture even further. Overall, this environmental disaster has affected 3.5–7 million people.³²

Although not always as dramatic, similar tragedies due to unsustainable development initiatives are unfolding around the world. Southeast Asia's mangrove forests have been decimated by shrimp farms that themselves have short productive lives; tropical rainforests have been cleared across the Amazon, erasing traditional lifestyles and countless undiscovered species; and 15,000 square kilometers of the Gulf of Mexico—an area nearly the size of Kuwait—is now dead from the spilling of farm wastes into the Mississippi River.³³

Overburdening the ecological systems peo-

ple depend on is thus creating grave new threats. Some of the strategies called for in the MDGs will naturally help counter these—for example, providing basic education to women tends to reduce fertility rates and, subsequently, population pressures. But they may also exacerbate the threats—education may provide the means or incentive to join the global consumer class, which could greatly increase resource use. Incorporating principles of sustainability directly into development strategies would help governments prevent further ecological stresses.³⁴

China is working to simultaneously reduce poverty and alleviate environmental problems with its ambitious rural electrification program. Ninety percent of the poorest people in China live in rural areas. The government has recognized that electricity is an effective means to alleviate poverty as it lowers dependence on biomass fuel (the burning of which often contributes to respiratory disease) and leaves more time for education by reducing the hours spent collecting water and fuel. Starting in late 2001, over a period of 20 months the government installed wind turbines, solar photovoltaics, and small hydroelectric arrays in more than a thousand townships, providing electricity to almost a million people. By using renewable energy resources, the government not only helped raise living standards in rural areas, it also reduced local environmental problems such as deforestation and desertification and lowered China's overall contribution to climate change.³⁵

As important as national development plans and policy changes are, however, a new definition of economic success is needed if nations are to set their economies on a sustainable path. Current understandings of success focus mainly on whether national economies, often measured in terms of gross domestic product, grow or shrink. Yet GDP hides the fact that some growth is destructive;

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an alternative that provides a better measure of success is needed.

While many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have created alternatives over the past three decades that have incorporated environmental and social costs into the GDP measure, 2004 may mark a turning point in this new approach. China announced that within the next three to five years it would adopt a Green GDP measure that would subtract resource depletion and pollution costs from GDP. Already this is being field-tested in the city of Chongqing and the province of Hainan. Early work suggests that China's average GDP growth would have been 1.2 percent lower between 1985 and 2000 had environmental costs been subtracted from the calculation. If fully implemented, not only would this lead China to pursue a more sustainable development path, it could push the world's other major economies to follow suit—which could set in motion a powerful transformation in the types of economic development the world values.³⁶

Achieving the Millennium Development Goals will require greater investment. Some countries are already recognizing this and acting accordingly. In 2003, for example, Brazil delayed the purchase of \$760 million worth of jet fighters and cut its military budget by 4 percent in order to finance an ambitious anti-hunger program. Costa Rica, by having no military for the past 50 years, has been able to devote a much larger portion of its budget to social spending—with impressive results. With a similar GDP per capita as Latin America as a whole, Costa Rica has the highest life expectancy and one of the highest literacy rates in the entire region. Even if developing countries redirect just a small portion of their estimated military expenditures of over \$220 billion to achieving the MDGs, significant additional funding could be available.³⁷

But most of these countries will need more funding than they can provide themselves. Indeed, for the poorest countries it will be nearly impossible to find enough funds within their own budgets to provide basic services. WHO estimates, for example, that to sustain a public health system, a minimum of \$35–40 per person each year is necessary. For the poorest countries, where GDP per capita is in the low hundreds, this will be impossible without outside aid. As the eighth MDG makes clear, a concerted effort from industrial countries and global institutions will be essential—both in providing additional development aid and in “leveling the playing field” through initiatives like increased debt relief and fairer trade.³⁸

Too little aid is currently provided to achieve the MDGs. In 2003, donor countries gave \$68 billion in official development assistance (ODA), or just 0.25 percent of their gross national incomes (GNI). At the Johannesburg summit, governments reconfirmed the need to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in aid. But only five countries have done this—Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. If all donors actually met this readily attainable goal, annual development aid would increase by over \$110 billion—more than twice the estimated \$50 billion in additional annual funds needed to achieve the MDGs. So far only Belgium and Ireland have announced plans to increase their ODA to 0.7 percent.³⁹

In addition, donor countries will have to do better at targeting the aid they provide. In 2001, more than a fifth of the aid was conditioned on purchasing goods and services from the donor country, while less than a third went to improving basic health, sanitation, and education services. To address non-traditional security threats successfully, more aid will have to go directly toward achieving the MDGs.⁴⁰

Donor countries must also do more to reduce the unpayable burdens of highly indebted poor countries, many of which spend a significant percentage of their annual GDP servicing outstanding debts—often at the expense of providing basic social services. After a long campaign for debt relief in the 1990s, the benefits are starting to accrue. The 26 countries that have received some relief have reduced their debt service by 42 percent, from \$3.8 billion in 1998 to \$2.2 billion in 2001. Some 65 percent of these savings have been redirected to health and education programs. This has helped Uganda, for instance, achieve nearly universal primary school enrolment. Yet sub-Saharan Africa—the region furthest behind in achieving the MDGs—continues to pay creditor nations \$13 billion a year in debt service.⁴¹

While aid and debt relief will help significantly, these gains are often overshadowed by the disparities created by the trade subsidies and tariffs of industrial countries. For example, while the European Union gives about \$8 in aid per person in sub-Saharan Africa each year, it gives \$913 in subsidies per cow in Europe. In total, more than \$300 billion in annual subsidies and agricultural tariffs weaken the ability of farmers in developing countries to compete with farmers elsewhere. According to a 2004 study by the Institute for International Economics and the Center for Global Development, removing these tariffs and subsidies could pull 200 million people out of poverty by 2020.⁴²

Another potential source of significant ODA could be money from redirected military funding. (See Figure 9–1.) In fact, redirecting just 7.4 percent of donor governments' military budgets to development aid would provide all the additional funds—\$50 billion a year—needed to pay for the MDGs. According to a 2004 report by the Center for Defense Information and Foreign Policy in Focus,

\$51 billion—or 13 percent—could be cut from the U.S. military budget just by removing outdated, unnecessary programs. This alone could provide the additional funds needed to attain the MDGs.⁴³

In 2003, Brazil delayed the purchase of \$760 million worth of jet fighters and cut its military budget by 4 percent in order to finance an ambitious anti-hunger program.

One of the most promising and comprehensive commitments to development comes from Sweden. At the end of 2003, the Swedish government passed a bill entitled Shared Responsibility—Sweden's Policy for Global Development. This commits the government to facilitate development not just through aid, which it also plans to increase to 1.0 percent of GDP, but by aligning all government policies—trade, agriculture, environment, defense—around a guiding principle of equitable and sustainable global development. In September 2004, the Swedish government released its first annual progress report. Used as a way to provide an overview of the current policy climate, the report documented the many inconsistencies within current policies and provided a starting point to engage government ministries and civil society in reorienting Swedish policy around a global sustainable development plan.⁴⁴

Even if the Millennium Development Goals were achieved by 2015, however, there would still be 400 million people who are undernourished, 600 million who live on less than \$1 per day, and 1.2 billion without access to improved sanitation. And the world is not even close to meeting these modest goals. To do so, governments will have to make strong commitments—and then live up to them.⁴⁵

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


Figure 9–1. Military Expenditures versus Development Assistance, Selected Countries and All Donors, 2003

Engaging Civil Society

Success in creating a more secure and more peaceful world is likelier if civil society is involved in the effort. Fortunately, the record of the past 15 years suggests that actors from the civil sector—especially NGOs, a subset of civil society organizations—have emerged as skilled players in global politics and even as leaders on the broad range of issues relevant to security. (See Box 9–3.) The selection of Wangari Maathai, leader of Kenya’s Green Belt movement, to receive the 2004 Nobel Prize for Peace is an encouraging example of the acceptance of such leaders on the international stage and of the environment’s link to concerns about peace and security. The

growing effectiveness of civil society can be credited to a diverse set of assets that strengthen groups’ capacity to “network”—perhaps the emblematic verb of this globalizing age. Civil society may best be able to help lay the foundations for peace by further developing this capacity to be effective partners and applying these skills to security issues.⁴⁶

A powerful illustration of the civil sector’s skill in reaching across national borders on a security issue came in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, when

a global antiwar movement emerged that generated the largest demonstrations in history: millions of people gathered in hundreds of cities worldwide during the weekend of February 15, 2003, to protest the looming hostilities in Iraq. Although the movement failed to stop the war, it posted some noteworthy successes. Mobilizing a global public at a single moment on a critical issue was itself a considerable advance for civil society. And for the first time since the founding of the United Nations, public opinion helped prevent the United States from gaining a majority of Security Council votes on an issue it considered of vital importance—aided, of course, by concern among member states that weapons inspectors had not been allowed

BOX 9-3. THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The enhanced stature of civil society is the product of several societal trends that have emerged in the last two decades. Setting the stage was the advance of democracy in scores of countries, which opened up greater operating space for citizens and civic organizations. Since the 1980s, and especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall, dozens of countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America have abandoned totalitarian or authoritarian governments in favor of political systems that offered a greater degree of freedom of speech and of the press—the lifeblood of a vibrant civil sector. Meanwhile, some long-established democracies in Europe and the Americas began to turn to civil society organizations to take on responsibilities shunned by government and business, everything from running soup kitchens to implementing overseas development projects.

As the operating latitude of citizens' groups expanded, powerful and inexpensive communications technologies helped them organize and share information, enhancing their status as political players. By the 1980s, computers had become relatively cheap, portable, decentralized, and interconnected—a combination of attributes that has multiplied networking opportunities for organizations and individuals. In particular, the rapid advance of the Internet greatly enhanced opportunities for participatory democracy and for direct appeals to decisionmakers.

At the same time, international issues such as climate change and competition for water and other resources were gradually being recognized as too difficult for a single government, or even a group of governments, to address. Governments and businesses began to realize that partnerships with a liberated and empowered civil society could be an effective way of tackling some of today's more intractable issues.

Into this energized political space stepped the diverse set of civil entities known as NGOs. These generally work for a public purpose, typically on issues such as human rights, environmental protection, women's issues, and health care—and often from a wide range of political perspectives. NGOs are commonly regarded as being flexible, efficient, small, closely connected to citizens, and able to marry the operating efficiency of a business with the public purpose of government. Their growth has been notable even at the international level: between 1975 and 2000 the number of international NGOs has grown from fewer than 5,000 to roughly 25,000.

The newly empowered civil sector produced by this combination of historical trends led a *New York Times* reporter in 2003 to brand global public opinion a “second superpower”—a power whose activities political leaders ignore at considerable political risk.

SOURCE: See endnote 46.

to complete their work. Emboldened by the public protests and by polls showing that majorities opposed the war in nearly all nations surveyed on the question, the Security Council resisted U.S. pressure for an authorization of war. The Council's reluctance to give its blessing in turn energized antiwar organizers to continue their efforts.⁴⁷

The protests differed from peace marches of the twentieth century in ways that highlight the collaborative thread that runs

through today's civil society initiatives. Most obviously, the new demonstrations were coordinated by NGOs globally, although they were organized primarily at the local level. In the United States, for example, a new NGO known as United for Peace and Justice emerged to help coordinate more than 70 demonstrations across the country—and to publicize the demonstrations held in other countries. No previous cross-border peace demonstrations—neither the

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ones against the Viet Nam War in the 1960s nor those in opposition to nuclear weapons in the 1980s—had such extensive international coordination.⁴⁸

In addition, the February 2003 protests were distinctive because they were embedded in a larger web of civil society activity on issues that extend well beyond war. The genesis of the protests that day, in fact, was an organizing call made at a meeting of the European Social Forum in November 2002 and seconded at the World Social Forum (WSF) in January 2003, gatherings of CSOs and other civic actors that focus primarily on social and economic issues. And some of the organizing groups for the February 15 marches were veterans of the 1999 protests that shut down the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle. The linkages to a broader and globally active civil society movement suggests that the February 15 mobilization was not a passing moment of public pique.⁴⁹

Indeed, there is evidence that civil society's capacity to form the networks that give birth to events like regional and global Social Forums has been developing steadily over more than a decade. The Centre for the Study of Global Governance (CSGG) in London reports that CSOs have stepped up their convening activities markedly in recent years: nearly a third of the major international meetings on peace, environment, and development issues organized by such groups since 1988 were held in just a 15-month period in 2002 and 2003. And these meetings are increasingly sophisticated. Many are large—some 55 percent had more than 10,000 participants—and are increasingly likely to be independent ventures rather than “parallel” events to official governmental meetings. Beyond offering a global communications platform, the meetings are excellent opportunities for face-to-face networking: CSOs

surveyed for the CSGG report listed networking and partnering as primary objectives for attendance.⁵⁰

At the same time, some of the assets associated with CSO mobilizations and meetings cut two ways, suggesting a need for caution as these groups build on their successes to date. For starters, the energies of a broadly mobilized citizenry may have limited staying power and may need to be tapped sparingly. Perhaps tellingly, a call for global antiwar demonstrations in March 2004, on the first anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, produced only a fraction of the turnout of a year earlier and had little if any evident impact on the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Large-scale mobilizations may be difficult to organize with great frequency and may need to be used strategically for maximum effect. This reality will challenge civil society leaders globally to work together to determine when global mobilizations are warranted.⁵¹

In addition, CSO success in organizing large meetings may ironically create its own challenges. The World Social Forum has grown impressively—from 10,000 participants at the first gathering in 2001 to 100,000 or more in 2004, numbers that could easily strain the capacity for effective participation and could lead to the gatherings becoming little more than gabfests. This is a particular danger for the WSF, which was designed not to push a particular action agenda but to offer a space in which diverse views could be articulated under the rubric “another world is possible.” Now WSF veterans such as Arundhati Roy are suggesting that action opportunities should become a regular part of the meetings.⁵²

Finally, as public mobilizations achieve greater success, civil society will need to be alert for countermeasures that dilute its effectiveness. Citing security concerns, the city of New York, for example, went to great lengths

to minimize the impact of the February 15 marches by diverting protestors from planned routes and refusing to let the demonstration pass in front of the United Nations. Similar efforts were evident 18 months later when the city rerouted demonstrations planned for the Republican Convention in the summer of 2004 and arrested thousands of demonstrators on weak legal grounds. Challenges such as these in a country with a long history of legal protections of public protest suggest that civil actors cannot take their operating space—which in many countries is newly conquered terrain—for granted.⁵³

CSO networking is also facilitated through the use of new communications technologies. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), for example, was a coordinated effort in the 1990s of hundreds of CSOs tied together through e-mail and the Internet. The campaign conceived, drafted, and gained government support for a Treaty to Ban Landmines that by October 2004 had 143 signatories—the first time a treaty had been drafted and brought to fruition with leadership primarily from civil society. This achievement earned the ICBL the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. The group arguably was doubly deserving of the Peace Prize: for the treaty itself, which shows real promise of eliminating one of the great scourges afflicting postwar civilian populations, and for the innovative way in which the group worked, which strengthened civil society as a force for peace.⁵⁴

Other CSOs may be learning from the networking success of the ICBL. Research and advocacy on biological weapons, for example, were until recently spearheaded largely by pockets of specialists in the West, including small groups of academics and scientists who targeted policymakers rather than the public with information. But since 2001 a few NGOs like the Sunshine Project in

Germany and the United States have worked to broaden interest by reframing the topic to include issues CSOs are already active on, such as biodiversity and biosafety. Another group, the BioWeapons Prevention Project, has borrowed from the toolbox of grassroots activities to ramp up action on biological warfare issues. It has established networks of citizen groups in Europe, North America, and Africa, along with an annual *BioWeapons Monitor*, to help the public track compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. Using Web pages, e-mail, and other modern communications technologies, these two groups are broadening the constituency interested in biological and chemical issues beyond scientists, beyond western industrial countries, and beyond the traditional security community.⁵⁵

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines was a coordinated effort in the 1990s of hundreds of CSOs tied together through e-mail and the Internet.

Another impressive example of the use of technology is the citizen mobilization that forced Philippine President Joseph Estrada to resign in January 2001. Alerted that his impeachment trial for corruption had been suspended indefinitely, outraged citizens used text messaging on cell phones and computers to organize a protest that drew 150,000 people to downtown Manila within two hours. Protesters kept vigil for four days in numbers large enough that the president felt compelled to step down.⁵⁶

Such successes are possible, of course, only where the technology is available. CSOs in wealthier countries could help ensure that less prosperous organizations are as effective as possible by getting them the technologies

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they need. An inspiring example of such collaboration is the work of Witness, a U.S. nonprofit established in 1992 to provide camcorders, technical training, and coaching in message development to CSOs around the world. Capitalizing on the increased power and reduced price of handheld movie cameras and video editing equipment in the past two decades, Witness set out to help civil actors document abuses of people and the environment. By 2004, the group had collaborated with more than 200 CSO partners on projects in 50 countries and had scored several impressive successes, including the closing of a notorious Mexican mental health hospital following public broadcast of footage taken by a Witness-supported CSO. Witness videos are also credited with prompting the Philippine government to investigate the murder of indigenous activists who had been pursuing ancestral land claims.⁵⁷

Civil society, government, and businesses are forming partnerships to tackle issues of common interest, including problems of peace and security.

Beyond their work with other actors in civil society, CSOs are also gaining valuable experience in collaborating with government and industry to address some of society's most intractable problems. The traditional pattern of international diplomacy, in which crossborder policy initiatives were largely undertaken by governments and international organizations (with pressure, at times, from business and occasionally from civil society) is giving way to a new dynamic. Civil society, government, and businesses are forming partnerships—often temporary and nonhierarchical in character—to tackle issues of common interest, including problems of

peace and security. These “global public policy networks” offer a seat at the policymaking table for NGOs and other civil society organizations in unprecedented ways. (See Table 9–3.)⁵⁸

One example of the new collaboration is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a cooperative arrangement of diamond companies, governments, and CSOs that certifies that exported diamonds are not “conflict diamonds”—rough gems whose sale generated revenues that were used to fund civil conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and other countries. Begun in early 2003 following a U.N. General Assembly call for diamond certification in 2000, Kimberley process certification now covers some 98 percent of the world's diamond exports. Industry, CSOs, and governments sit together on working groups that administer the scheme and monitor its functioning.⁵⁹

How successful the Kimberley Process will be remains in question. Critics charge that diamond retailers have been slow to back the process by ensuring that diamonds are conflict-free. On the other hand, the KPCS has proved itself willing to get tough with governments, as in its July 2004 decision to evict the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the organization after it was unable to document the origin of Congolese diamonds and guarantee that they were clean. The action prevents Congo from exporting diamonds to any other of the 43 KPCS members that engage in diamond trade.⁶⁰

Collaborative NGO, government, and business networks hold great promise for addressing assorted security issues and deserve the support of governments and international institutions. U.N. promotion of this kind of partnership at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 is an example of the kind of institutional support

Table 9–3. Selected Global Public Policy Networks

Network Name	Selected Partners	Details
Roll Back Malaria	Bayer Environmental Science, CORE, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, WHO, governments of Ghana, India, and Italy	Launched in 1998, the goal is to halve the burden of malaria by 2010 through a coordinated international approach.
World Commission on Dams	FAO, International Energy Agency, IUCN, Transparency International, UNEP, World Bank, WHO	In 1998, the commission undertook two years of consultations and case studies on the role of big dams in development. The final report was released in 2000, and in 2001 the UNEP Dams and Development Project was created to disseminate the report's findings.
Global Water Partnership	European Union, IFPRI, Peking University, Swedish International Development Agency, UNDP, World Bank	The partnership was established after the Dublin and Rio de Janeiro conferences of 1992 to support countries in the sustainable management of their water resources.
Africa Stockpiles Programme	African Union, CropLife International, GEF, Pesticide Action Network–Africa, UNEP, WHO, WWF	This program began in 2000 as a multistakeholder effort to clean up stockpiles of obsolete pesticides in Africa, to dispose of persistent organic chemicals according to international guidelines, and to prevent future pesticide accumulation.
Global Village Energy Partnership	BP Solar, USAID, UNDP, Winrock International, World Bank	Launched in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, this partnership aims to increase communication between energy investors, entrepreneurs, and users; to develop village energy policies; and to provide 400 million more people with access to modern energy services such as heating, cooling, and cooking.

SOURCE: See endnote 58.

these initiatives need. At the meeting in Johannesburg, more than 100 major partnerships of governments, businesses, and NGOs were established that address issues from water management to promotion of renewable energy.⁶¹

International institutions can also support cross-sectoral networks indirectly by working with CSOs and giving them legitimacy as potential partners for government and business. The World Bank has increasingly consulted with CSOs in its work over the past decade—it claims that some 70 percent of its projects involved collaboration with CSOs

in 2002, up from 50 percent five years earlier, a promising development that raises the stature of civil society.⁶²

Meanwhile, the United Nations is also currently taking steps to promote greater inclusion of NGOs. Civil society has long been active in U.N. economic and social work, particularly through major U.N. conferences and, following the Earth Summit in Rio, through the Commission on Sustainable Development. But the Security Council has traditionally been off-limits to any but official U.N. delegations. This is slowly starting to change, with the Council now allowing

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closed-door, off-the-record sharing of views between NGOs and official government delegates. In addition, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan is considering reforms that could lead to still more dialogue between civil society and the Security Council, involve civil society groups more closely in U.N. field work, and establish a special fund to help CSOs in developing countries increase their capacity to work effectively with the United Nations.⁶³

Education, the media, and religion are in strong positions to shape public understanding of how to make societies more peaceful and just.

Many issues remain to be tackled regarding the place of civil society in these policy networks. Of the diverse actors in the civil sector, which get access to a policy network, and who makes this decision? How representative are CSOs, whose leadership is seldom elected by and accountable to the public? What kinds of checks are needed to ensure that CSOs are not co-opted by their government or business partners? These and other complex issues remain to be settled as the public policy network movement matures. But the same spirit of collaboration that characterizes the operation of these networks can presumably help resolve process questions as well.

The efforts of relatively new and fluid networks—whether transient collaborations among NGOs or the more institutionalized efforts of policy networks—can themselves be buttressed by the values-shaping work of long-established centers of influence in civil society. In particular, education, the media, and religion are in strong positions to shape public understanding of global

political processes and of how to make societies more peaceful and just. Each of these institutions has a checkered history, of course, in wielding power. Schools, the media, and centers of worship are sometimes as effective at calling citizens to arms as in leading them in peacemaking.

Twentieth-century education, for example—despite all its success—has been criticized for turning out the citizens and leaders who engineered the most violent and most environmentally destructive century in human history. It is also worth noting that some of the most durable civilizations on record were led by people with no formal schooling as we know it today. Yet schools could just as conceivably be institutions that turn out “global citizens”: those who understand their connectedness to the people and problems of other lands, who wrestle with fundamental questions of global justice, and who feel deeply that the natural environment is an integral part of their well-being and therefore deserves protection. Creating such an educational system is a major challenge for the twenty-first century.

Meanwhile, the world’s media—television, radio, newspapers, books, music, and the Internet, among other outlets—might be thought of as a parallel education system, so widespread is its reach and so powerful its capacity to shape worldviews. A Pew Research Center poll in March 2003 found that 41 percent of Americans identified the media as the primary influence in shaping their views on the Iraq war. A media that broadens citizens’ visions, that offers a diversity of perspectives on great societal issues, and that is retooled to depend far less for its sustenance on advertising would powerfully influence societal values in a direction more consistent with the needs of a globalized, environmentally and socially stressed world.⁶⁴

Finally, religious influence over worldviews

is considerable, often operating at the deepest levels of the human psyche and expressed through ritual, scriptural teachings, and moral exhortation. Sometimes wielded violently and for repressive ends, this power has nevertheless been used impressively in constructive ways as well. Gandhi's movement for Indian independence, the U.S. civil rights struggle, the global boycott of infant formula in the 1970s, the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, and the campaign to restructure developing-country debt in the 1990s were all led or heavily influenced by religious people and organizations. And collaborative efforts to end conflict, such as the initiatives of Sri Lanka's Interreligious Peace Foundation—a group of Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and Baha'is working for peace in the island nation—offer hope that religious groups can combine their influence in the cause of peace.⁶⁵

Drawing on the power of the world's diverse religious traditions to shape perspectives on the suite of crises facing the global community today—especially war, inequity, and environmental degradation—could profoundly affect the course of events in this new century.

Such a new focus among these three centers of influence would contribute greatly to strengthening an invigorated and empowered civil sector. It would also facilitate reforming international institutions and achieving the social, economic, and environmental visions endorsed by the Millennium Assembly and the World Summit on Sustainable Development. A globally oriented citizenry that embraced a sense of solidarity with the world's poorest and responsibility for the planet that sustains us all would likely not only support new policy initiatives, it would insist on them.

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